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While there is consensus that depression is associated with a memory bias characterized by reduced
retrieval of positive information that is restricted to information that had been self-referentially pro-
cessed, there is less agreement concerning whether depression is characterized by an attention bias
involving reduced attention to positive information. However, unlike memory research, previous
attention research has not systematically examined the potential role of referential processing focus. The
present study tested the hypothesis that evidence of depression-linked attentional avoidance of positive
information would be more readily obtained following the self-referential processing of such informa-
tion. We assessed attentional responding to positive information (and also to negative information) using
a dot-probe procedure, after this information had been processed either in a self-referential or other-
referential manner. The ﬁndings lend support to the hypothesis under scrutiny. Participants scoring
high in depression score exhibited reduced attention to positive information compared to those scoring
low in depression score, but only when this information had been processed in a self-referential manner.
These ﬁndings may shed light on the mechanisms that underpin attentional selectivity in depression,
while potentially also helping to account for inconsistencies in previous literature.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Cognitive theories of depression posit that systematic biases in
the processing of emotional information distort subjective reality in
ways that elevate negative emotional disposition (Beck, 1976;
Ingram, 1984; Teasdale, 1988). For example, Beck argues that
depressed individuals possess schemas that guide the operation of
memory and attention in ways that result in processing advantages
for schema congruent information (Beck, 1976). Considerable
research effort over the past three decades has sought to determine
whether biases in attention and memory are characteristic of
elevated vulnerability to depression (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994,
2005). While clear experimental evidence of a depression-linked
memory bias has been obtained, there has been debate concern-
ing whether or not depression is characterized by an attentional
bias (Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, &
Mathews, 1997).
Depression-linked memory bias is more evident for emotionallyCognition & Brain Sciences
ngdom.
r Ltd. This is an open access articlepositive information than for emotionally negative information.
Speciﬁcally, relatively impaired memory for positive information
(rather than relative enhanced memory for negative information)
has been observed in individuals with clinical levels of depression
compared to healthy controls (Breslow, Kocsis,& Belkin, 1981; Burt,
Zembar, & Niederehe, 1995; Dozois & Dobson, 2001; McDowall,
1984), as well as individuals experiencing depressed mood
(dysphoria) compared to healthy controls (Finkel, Glass, &
Merluzzi, 1982; Ingram, Smith, & Brehm, 1983; Murray,
Whitehouse, & Alloy, 1999). This pattern of bias has also been
observed in individuals with experimentally induced negative
mood compared to those with experimentally induced positive
mood (Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Study 2; Nasby & Yando,
1982; Study 1).
Although there is general agreement that depression is char-
acterized by biased memory processing (c.f. Matt, Vazquez, &
Campbell, 1992; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), it is important to
note that such effects are only reliably observed under a very
particular processing condition (Blaney, 1986; Matt et al., 1992).
Critically, several reviews have noted that depression-linked
memory selectivity is robustly observed only after emotionalunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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manner (Blaney, 1986; Gaddy & Ingram, 2014; Matt et al., 1992).
In a typical experimental paradigm, referential processing focus is
manipulated by having participants rate a list of positive and
negative personality attribute words according to whether or not
each attribute is descriptive of the self (self-referential condition)
or descriptive of a familiar other (other-referential condition).
Participants’ memory for the stimuli is subsequently tested using
explicit recall paradigms. In studies where referential focus has
been left unconstrained during encoding, evidence of depression-
linked memory bias has been mixed. While some studies do ﬁnd
memory impairment for positive information in clinically
depressed individuals compared to non-depressed controls
(Breslow et al., 1981), others fail to observe anymemory differences
between depressed and non-depressed controls (Hasher, Rose,
Zacks, Sanft, & Doren, 1985). However, when investigators have
experimentally elicited self-referential processing of the stimuli
prior to the memory test, a depression-linked bias reﬂecting
reduced memory for positive information has been observed. No
such effect is evidenced when the stimuli initially has been pro-
cessed in an other-referential manner (Bradley & Mathews, 1983;
Kuiper & Derry, 1982). Such ﬁndings have led investigators to
conclude that this memory bias is driven by a distorted self-schema
in depressed individuals that is characterized by a lack of positive
information about the self (Dozois & Dobson, 2001).
Evidence of this depression-linked memory bias has generally
been consistent across studies (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In
contrast, while meta-analytic investigations have revealed that
across studies, on average, there is evidence of a depression-linked
attentional bias (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010; Winer & Salem,
2016), whether or not such attentional bias is observed in an in-
dividual study has been highly variable (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010;
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Some studies using variants of the
attention probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) to assess
attention bias report ﬁndings that individuals experiencing
depressedmood (Bradley, Mogg, Falla,&Hamilton,1998;McCabe&
Toman, 2000), or clinical levels of depression (Gotlib, McLachlan, &
Katz, 1988), exhibit reduced attention to positive information
compared to healthy controls. However, many more studies using
similar attentional assessment approaches have failed to ﬁnd any
depression-linked individual differences in the attentional pro-
cessing of positive (or negative) information (Mogg, Bradley, &
Williams, 1995; Bradley, Mogg, & Lee, 1997; for a review see;
Mogg & Bradley, 2005).
Researchers have speculated about the precise processing con-
ditions under which depression-linked attentional bias may be
observed. The idea that has received most experimental scrutiny is
that depression-linked attentional bias may be more evident at
longer stimulus exposure durations (e.g. 1000 ms) than shorter
stimulus exposure durations (e.g. 500 ms; Mogg & Bradley, 1998),
perhaps reﬂecting increased attentional disengagement from pos-
itive information, rather than reduced attentional engagement
with such positive emotional information (Sanchez, Vazquez,
Marker, LeMoult, & Joormann, 2013; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven,
Franck, & Crombez, 2005). Consistent with this idea, the majority
of attentional probe studies reporting evidence of depression-
linked attentional bias have employed stimulus exposure dura-
tions of 1000 ms or above (c.f. Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Mogg &
Bradley, 2005), while failures to demonstrate this effect have
employed stimulus exposure durations of 500 ms or shorter
(Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007). However, this hypothesis
cannot fully account for the observed inconsistencies, given that
several studies employing stimulus exposure durations of 1000 ms
or more have failed to obtain evidence of a depression-linked
attention bias (Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000; Neshat-Doost,Moradi, Taghavi, Yule, & Dalgleish, 2000), and on occasions, evi-
dence of depression-linked attentional bias has been obtained us-
ing 500 ms stimulus exposure durations (Mathews, Ridgeway, &
Williamson, 1996; Shane & Peterson, 2007). Hence, cross-study
variation in the use of shorter and longer stimulus exposure du-
rations cannot sufﬁce to explain the observed inconsistency con-
cerning depression-linked bias in attentional responding to
emotional information.
Intriguingly, despite evidence that depression-linked memory
impairment for positive information is restricted to conditions in
which information has been processed in a self-referential manner
(Blaney, 1986; Gaddy& Ingram, 2014; Matt et al., 1992), no research
has tested the possibility that evidence for a depression-linked
reduction in attention to positive information may be more
readily obtained following self-referential processing of such in-
formation. Indeed, if depression-linked information processing bias
is driven by the operation of a depressogenic self-schema that lacks
positive information, as previous theorists have argued, then
reduced attention to positive information in high-depression
compared to low-depression participants would be dispropor-
tionately evident when this self-schema has been activated by
having participants process this emotional information in a self-
referential rather than other-referential manner. Importantly, the
degree to which participants have engaged in the self-referential
processing of stimulus information is likely to have varied in an
uncontrolled manner across prior experiments assessing
depression-linked attentional bias, because referential processing
focus had not been systematically constrained or manipulated.
Such variability may have contributed to the pattern of inconsistent
ﬁndings observed within this literature to date.
The present study was designed to directly test this referential
processing focus hypothesis. Using the well-established dot-probe
task, we contrasted patterns of attentional bias to emotional in-
formation in participants who scored either high or low on the 21-
item Depression subscale of the Depression, Anxiety & Stress Scale
(DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). To dissociate selective
attentional responding to positive information from selective
attentional responding to negative information, it is necessary to
pair each type of emotional stimulus with an unemotional stim-
ulus. While some researchers carrying out such attentional
assessment have employed neutral words as the unemotional
stimulus, others have expressed concern that words intended to be
neutral may, for some participants, have emotional signiﬁcance due
to past associations and experience (Grafton, Southworth, Watkins,
& MacLeod, 2016), particularly in depressed individuals who are
known to display negatively biased interpretations of neutral in-
formation (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999). Thus, to eliminate this pos-
sibility, these investigators have used meaningless non-words as
the non-emotional stimulus, and have successfully dissociated
biased attentional processing of positive information from biased
attentional processing of negative information (e.g. Grafton,
Watkins, & MacLeod, 2012; Grafton et al., 2016). Hence, we adop-
ted this approach in the current dot-probe task, by presenting
emotionally positive and negative words that each were paired
with a non-word letter string, for 500 ms or 1000 ms, and inferring
the resulting attentional distribution between members of the
stimulus pair from relative discrimination latencies for probes that
then appeared in the locus of either stimulus. Of critical impor-
tance, to determine whether depression-linked attentional bias is
more evident when stimuli have initially been processed in a self-
referential rather than an other-referential manner, this attentional
bias assessment was carried out after participants had ﬁrst judged
whether each stimulus word was descriptive of the self (self-
referential condition) or was descriptive of another speciﬁed indi-
vidual (other-referential condition). In keeping with the approach
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other-referential condition was a familiar public ﬁgure (Kuiper &
Derry, 1982; Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring, & Greenberg, 1989).
The hypothesis under test predicts that evidence of reduced
attention to positive information in individuals with high levels of
depression compared to those with low levels of depression would
be disproportionately great under the self-referential processing
condition than under the other-referent processing condition.
1. Method
1.1. Participants
Participants were forty-ﬁve introductory psychology students at
the University of Western Australia. We sought to distinguish par-
ticipants who scored relatively high and relatively low on the
depression subscale of the 21-item Depression, Anxiety, and Stress
Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Thus, we screened
700 ﬁrst year psychology students on this instrument. Anticipating
regression to the mean between the time of this screening and the
test session (scheduled approximately 3e5 weeks later), only those
individuals who scored either in the top or bottom 20% of the
resulting screening score distribution were invited to participate in
the study. This resulted in the recruitment of 23 participants with
high DASS-21 depression scores at screening (score range¼ 14e42,
M ¼ 25.65, SD ¼ 7.45), and 22 with low DASS-21 depression scores
at screening (score range¼ 0e4, M ¼ 1.81, SD ¼ 1.22), giving rise to
the between group factor Depression Level (High depression vs.
Low depression). Participants from each group were randomly
allocated to either the self-referential processing condition or to the
other-referential processing condition, giving rise to a second fac-
tor, nested within the Depression Group factor, which is here
termed Processing Condition (Self-referential processing vs. Other-
referential processing).
As intended, DASS depression scores differed as a function of the
Depression Level factor, F (1, 44) ¼ 75.38, p < 0.001, h2p ¼ 0.65, but
not as a function of the Processing Condition factor, F (1,
44) ¼ 0.005, p ¼ 0.94, or as an interactive function of both factors, F
(1, 44) ¼ 0.02, p ¼ 0.89. An equivalent analysis carried out on age
provided the reassurance that participant age did not differ as a
function of either factor or their interaction (in all cases p > 0.05).
Gender ratio did not differ signiﬁcantly across the four cells,
resulting from the nested combination of these two factors, all c2 (1,
45) < 0.08, p > 0.78.
1.2. Materials
1.2.1. Experimental stimuli
We required 96 pairs of letter strings in which one member was
a trait descriptive word of either negative or positive emotional
valence, while the other was a length-matched non-word, which
was devoid of emotional content. We selected 48 positive and 48
negative trait descriptor words, based on the “Likeableness” norms
for 555 personality-trait words provided by Anderson (1968). Trait
“likeableness” in Anderson (1968) was indexed by ratings given to
each word on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (least likeable)
to 6 (most likeable). Our 48 positive and negative trait word
members differed signiﬁcantly in mean Likeableness rating, t
(94) ¼ 33.31, p < 0.001. The mean Likeableness scores for our
positive trait words was M ¼ 4.56, SD ¼ 0.44, and for our negative
wordswasM¼ 1.51, SD¼ 0.45. Each of thesewordswas pairedwith
a length-matched non-word, created by randomly selecting char-
acters from the alphabet without replacement, thereby giving rise
to the 96 letter string pairs. The full set of experimental wordstimuli is provided in the Appendix.
1.2.2. Depression, anxiety, and stress scale
Participants’ levels of depression symptomswere assessed using
the Depression subscale of the 21-item Depression, Anxiety, and
Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). This sub-scale
requires participants to respond to seven statements describing
various depressive symptoms on a four-point scale, ranging from
0 (Does not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applies to me very much). The
DASS-21 has been shown to have both good reliability and validity
(Henry & Crawford, 2005; Osman et al., 2012).
1.2.3. Experimental hardware
The attentional probe task was run using a Hewlett-Packard PC,
and presented on a 22-inch widescreen color monitor set at a
resolution of 1680  1050 pixels. All responses were made using a
standard two-button mouse.
1.2.4. Experimental task
To ensure that participants initially processed the stimulus
words in either a self-referential or other-referential manner, a
block of referential judgment trials preceded each block of 96 probe
trials. These referential judgment trials required participants either
to judge whether each word described themselves, or a familiar
television news anchor, depending on whether the participant had
been assigned to the Self-referential or Other-referential processing
condition, respectively. Across the full task, six blocks of attentional
probe trials, each preceded by a block of referential judgment trials,
were delivered. The speciﬁc nature of each trial typewas as follows.
1.2.4.1. Referential judgment trials. For participants assigned to the
Self-referential processing condition, each block of referential
judgment trials commenced with the onscreen instruction “Now
you will be asked to judge whether words describe you. Press any key
to continue”. Each referential judgment trial then presented a single
word from the stimulus set in the center of the screen, where it
remained until participants indicated whether this word described
them. The next word then immediately appeared for rating. Re-
sponses were made using the right and left mouse buttons, to
respectively indicate a “yes” response (word is self-descriptive) and
a “no” response (word is not self-descriptive). Participants assigned
to the Other-referential processing condition were required at the
beginning of the test session to select, from a list of Western
Australian television news anchors, one individual they were
familiar with but felt emotionally neutral towards. For these par-
ticipants, each block of referential judgment trials began with the
onscreen instruction “Now you will be asked to judge whether the
words describe television news anchor xxx. Press any key to continue”,
where xxx was the name of the television news anchor the
participant had selected. The referential judgment trials for par-
ticipants in this Other-referential processing condition presented
single words, just as in the Self-referential processing condition,
but participants nowwere required to indicate whether or not each
word was descriptive of the target television news anchor. Again,
responses were made using the right and left mouse buttons, to
respectively indicate a “yes” response (word describes television
news anchor) and a “no” response (word does not describe tele-
vision news anchor).
1.2.4.2. Attentional probe trials. In the attention probe task, par-
ticipants were ﬁrst presented with a pair of emotionally discrepant
stimuli, and were then required to discriminate the identity of a
small visual probe that appeared in the locus of either preceding
stimuli. It is assumed that probe discrimination latencies will be
1 In keeping with Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, and De Houwer (2004), across all
conditions, RTs were excluded if they fell below 200 ms or above 2000 ms, and in
keeping with Rudaizky et al. (2014), within each condition, RTs were excluded if
they fell more than 2.58 SD away from the participant's mean RT for that condition.
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attention is focused prior to probe onset. Hence, relative discrimi-
nation latencies for probes that appear in the locus of differentially
valenced members of these stimulus pairs served to reveal how
attention was distributed between them, and thereby index se-
lective attentional responding to emotional information.
Each block of attentional probe trials commenced with the
onscreen instruction “Now you will complete a set of dot-probe trials.
Press any key to continue”. On each trial, a central ﬁxation cross ﬁrst
was displayed for 500 ms, followed by the presentation of one of
the letter string pairs, one member appearing just above and the
other just below the locus of the previously presented ﬁxation
cross. The word member of the pair appeared in the upper or lower
position with equal frequency. The vertical distance between the
two letter strings was 3 cm, leading to a visual viewing angle of just
<3 at the instructed viewing distance of 60 cm. The letter string
pair remained on screen for either 500 ms or 1000 ms with equal
frequency, before disappearing. A small visual probe then was
presented in the locus where either of the preceding letter strings
had been shown, and this probe appeared with equal frequency in
the locus of the word or the non-word member of this letter string.
This probe comprised of either a single small dot, or a pair of
immediately adjacent dots, with equal probability. Participants
were required to discriminate which of these two probes was
presented as quickly and accurately as possible, by pressing the left
mouse button to indicate one dot, or the right mouse button to
indicate two dots. The latency to make each probe discrimination
response was recorded.
1.3. Procedure
Participants were tested individually. Upon arrival participants
completed the DASS-21 questionnaire to verify that individuals in
the High depression and Low depression groups respectively
remained in the upper and lower halves of the DASS-21 score dis-
tribution observed at test time. Participants were then seated
approximately 60 cm viewing distance from the computer screen.
Participants in the Self-referential processing condition were told
that they would complete two types of tasks, one requiring them to
judge whether or not presented words were self-descriptive, and
the other requiring them to discriminate the identity of small visual
probes presented after pairs of letter strings. Participants in the
Other-referential processing condition were ﬁrst asked to select an
individual from a list of Western Australian news anchors that they
were familiar with but felt emotionally neutral towards. They then
were told that they would complete two types of tasks, one
requiring them to judge whether or not presented words were
descriptive of this chosen news anchor, and the other requiring
them to discriminate the identity of small visual probes presented
after pairs of letter strings. All participants were advised that the
experiment involved six blocks, each beginning with a set of
referential judgment trials, followed by a set of probe discrimina-
tion trials. After the referential judgment procedure was explained,
participants practiced the dot-probe component of the task over 24
practice trials. Each practice trial consisted of an emotionally
neutral word letter string, not used in the actual dot-probe task,
paired with an emotionally neutral non-word letter string. The
experimental task was then completed, following which partici-
pants were debriefed.
1.4. Data analysis plan
Probe discrimination latency data can serve to index attentional
selectivity only when participants accurately perform the probe
discrimination task, andminimum accuracy requirement was set at90%. Latencies from correct probe discrimination trials were used to
compute two measures of attentional selectivity, after ﬁrst
excluding outlying values in accordance with prior conventions.1
The ﬁrst bias index used latencies from trials in which the word
member of the letter string pair was positive. This indexed atten-
tional bias to positive words by expressing the degree to which
discrimination latencies for probes presented in the locus of these
positive words were speeded, relative to probes presented in the
locus of the non-word members of these pairs. A higher score on
this index signiﬁes more attention to emotionally positive than to
unemotional information. The equation can be formally expressed
as:
Attentional Bias to PositiveWords Index¼ RT for probes in the
locus of non-words paired with positive words e RT for probes in
locus of positive words.
The second bias index used latencies from trials in which the
word member of the letter strings pair was negative. This indexed
attentional bias to negative words by expressing the degree to
which discrimination latencies for probes presented in the locus of
these negative words were speeded, relative to probes presented in
the locus of the non-wordmembers of such pairs. A higher score on
this index signiﬁes greater attention to emotionally negative than
to unemotional information. Formally, the equation can be
expressed as:
Attentional Bias to Negative Words Index ¼ RT for probes in
the locus of non-words paired with negative words e RT for probes
in locus of negative words.
2. Results
Two participants initially selected on the basis of their high
DASS-21 scores at screening obtained DASS-21 scores that fell
below the median score at test time, and two participants initially
selected on the basis of their low DASS-21 scores at screening ob-
tained DASS-21 scores that fell above the median score at test time.
These four participants were consequently excluded from our an-
alyses. In addition, three participants failed to achieve the required
accuracy level of 90% on the attentional probe task, thus these
participants also were excluded from further consideration. The
remaining participants performed the task with a high level of
accuracy (M ¼ 97.50%, SD ¼ 2.29), indicating appropriate compli-
ance with task instructions. Accuracy rates did not differ as a
function of Depression Level, F (1, 34) ¼ 0.85, p ¼ 0.36, Processing
Condition, F (1, 34)¼ 0.01, p¼ 0.93, or from an interaction involving
these factors F (1, 34) ¼ 0.02, p ¼ 0.89.
2.1. Analysis of attentional bias to negative words index scores
The Attentional Bias to Negative Words Index scores, observed
under each condition, are shown in Table 1.
These bias index scores were subjected to a 2  2 x 2 mixed
design ANOVA that considered the two between-group factors
Depression Level (High depression vs. Low depression) and Pro-
cessing Condition (Self-referential processing vs. Other-referential
processing), and the within-group factor Exposure Duration
(500 ms vs. 1000 ms). This analysis revealed a two-way interaction
between Depression Level and Exposure Duration, F (1, 34) ¼ 6.77,
p ¼ 0.01, ƞ2 p ¼ 0.17, reﬂecting relatively greater evidence of
attentional vigilance for negative stimuli in the High depression
Table 2
Attentional bias to positive words.
Means and standard deviations of attentional bias to positive word index scores
(in ms)
Group Stimulus exposure duration
500 ms 1000 ms
M SD M SD
High Depression
Self-Referential 44.59 36.86 22.45 44.42
Other-Referential 2.07 40.40 15.23 54.59
Low Depression
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exposed for 1000ms compared towhen theywere exposed for only
500 ms. Critically, we found no evidence whatsoever that the
impact of Depression Level on Attentional Bias to Negative Infor-
mation Index scores was modiﬁed by the Processing Condition
factor, either as a two-way interaction, F (1, 34) < 0.001, p¼ 0.99, or
a three-way interaction involving Exposure Duration, F (1,
34) ¼ 0.14, p ¼ 0.71. As such, attentional processing of negative
information was unaffected by the self-referential processing or
other-referential processing of such information prior to attention
assessment.Self-Referential 4.71 90.31 9.37 20.88
Other-Referential 40.31 32.24 9.04 34.89
Fig. 1. Means and standard errors on the Attention Bias to Positive Words Index.2.2. Analysis of attentional bias to positive words index scores
The Attentional Bias to Positive Words Index scores, observed
under each condition, are shown in Table 2.
These bias index scores were subjected to the same 2  2 x 2
mixed design ANOVA, again considering the two between-group
factors Depression Level (High depression vs. Low depression)
and Processing Condition (Self-referential processing vs. Other-
referential processing), and the within-group factor Exposure
Duration (500 ms vs. 1000 ms). This analysis conﬁrmed the pre-
dicted two-way interaction between Depression Level x Processing
Condition, F (1, 34) ¼ 5.41, p ¼ 0.03, ƞ2p ¼ 0.14, which was the only
effect to achieve signiﬁcance. This signiﬁcant two-way interaction
is shown in Fig. 1.
As can be seen, the nature of this interaction is consistent with
the hypothesis that a depression-linked attentional bias involving a
relative reduction in attention to positive stimuli would be
disproportionately great in the Self-referential processing condi-
tion compared to the Other-referential processing condition. In fact,
such a pattern of means was observed only in the Self-referential
processing condition, and there was no evidence whatsoever of
reduced attention to positive information in the High depression
group compared to the Low depression group in the Other-
referential processing condition.3. Discussion
The ﬁndings of the present study support the hypothesis that, as
is the case with depression-linked memory bias, referential-focus
during the processing of emotional information moderates the
subsequent expression of depression-linked attentional bias to
such information. As predicted, evidence was obtained of a
depression-linked reduction in attention to positive information,
and consistent with the novel hypothesis under test, such evidence
was restricted to the self-referential processing condition. In
contrast, in the other-referential processing condition, therewas no
evidence whatsoever of such depression-linked reduced attentionTable 1
Attentional bias to negative words.
Means and standard deviations of attentional bias to negative word index scores
(in ms)
Group Stimulus exposure duration
500 ms 1000 ms
M SD M SD
High Depression
Self-Referential 32.84 48.13 14.05 40.56
Other-Referential 51.86 44.30 18.96 22.78
Low Depression
Self-Referential 2.11 57.08 33.74 30.40
Other-Referential 23.43 43.50 31.57 46.94to positive information. This pattern of results is consistent with
cognitive theories of depression postulating that a depressogenic
self-schema, which lacks positive information concerning the self,
may drive the patterns of selective information processing associ-
ated with elevated depression. It is plausible that inconsistencies
across previous studies, in terms of whether a depression-linked
reduced attention to positive information has been observed, may
reﬂect unintended variation across studies in whether participants
tended to engage in the self-referential processing of the presented
emotional information.
In the present study, there was no evidence that the observed
depression-linked reduction in attention to positive information
was moderated by stimulus exposure duration. If one adopts the
assumption that patterns of attentional selectivity observed at
shorter stimulus exposure durations reﬂect biased attentional
engagement with emotional information, and patterns of atten-
tional selectivity observed at longer stimulus exposure durations
reﬂect biased attentional disengagement from emotional infor-
mation, then the fact that this depression-linked attentional bias
was equally evident at both the shorter and longer stimulus
exposure duration invites speculation depression-linked reduction
in attention to positive information may equally be carried by
reduced engagement with, and increased disengagement from,
positive information. Future research could directly test this pos-
sibility by using newly developed variants of the dot-probe task
speciﬁcally conﬁgured to dissociate these two facets of attentional
selectivity (e.g. Grafton & MacLeod, 2014; Rudaizky, Basanovic, &
J.L. Ji et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 93 (2017) 47e5452MacLeod, 2014).
In keeping with previously reported ﬁndings using the dot-
probe task (e.g. Bradley et al., 1997; Shane & Peterson, 2007), and
other tasks that assess attentional deployment (e.g. McCabe, Gotlib,
& Martin, 2000), both the high and low depression groups in the
present study showed a general tendency to direct attention away
from negative stimuli. However, of importance to the issue under
consideration, there was no evidence that depression-linked
attentional responding to negative information was affected by
whether this information had been processed in a self- or other-
referential manner. Thus, there was no support for the idea that
biased attentional responding to negative information in depressed
individuals is driven by a depressogenic self-schema that is
disproportionately negative in content. Interestingly, there was
greater evidence of a depression-linked attentional bias to negative
information at the longer stimuli exposure duration than at the
shorter exposure duration, with stimulus exposure duration
signiﬁcantly moderating the impact of the depression group factor
in this analysis. This suggests that depression-linked attentional
bias to negative informationmay bemore strongly characterized by
impaired attentional disengagement from, rather than by enhanced
attentional engagement with, negative information. This pattern of
ﬁndings also lends weight to the argument that variation in stim-
ulus exposure durationmay account for some of the inconsistencies
across past studies, in terms of whether a depression-linked
attentional bias to negative information has been observed.
These present ﬁndings are the ﬁrst to demonstrate that self vs.
other referential processing impacts on depression-linked atten-
tional responding to positive information. Social psychology
research on self versus other judgments have shown that, while
healthy individuals exhibit a robust positive “illusory glow” in be-
liefs and judgments about the self in comparison to others
(Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & Barton, 1980, c.f.; Mezulis,
Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004), depressed individuals show
comparatively reduced self-enhancement bias (Alloy & Ahrens,
1987), and a higher tendency to evaluate the self unfavorably in
comparison to others (Butzer & Kuiper, 2006; Wood & Lockwood,
1999). Clearly, a pattern of attentional selectivity involving
greater avoidance of positive information in general would not
contribute to such a pattern of depression-linked self vs. other
evaluations. However, greater attentional avoidance of positive
information that has been processed in a self-referential manner,
relative to positive information that has been processed in an other-
referential manner, could indeed contribute to unfavorable com-
parisons between the self and others, as is characteristic of
depressogenic thinking. Future research can now employ the
experimental paradigm introduced in the present study to directly
test whether depression-linked attentional avoidance of self-
referential relative to other-referential positive information con-
tributes to depression-linked individual differences in social
comparative judgment.
In addition to advancing theoretical understanding of positive
information processing in depression, our ﬁndings may have po-
tential applied implications, particularly with respect to optimizing
the design of newly emerging attentional bias modiﬁcation (ABM)
approaches to the alleviation of depression (c.f. MacLeod &
Mathews, 2012). The ABM approach involves exposing partici-
pants to training versions of tasks such as the present dot-probe
procedure, now conﬁgured to change attentional selectivity by
consistently either presenting probes proximally to information
that it is intended to train participants to attend towards, and/or
presenting probes distally to information that it is intended to train
participants to attentionally avoid. Studies that have attempted to
alleviate depression by using ABM to induce increased attention to
positive information in clinical samples have yielded mixedﬁndings. While some such studies have elicited reductions in
depression symptoms (Browning et al., 2011; Browning, Holmes,
Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012), others have failed to attenuate
depression in this manner (Baert, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster,
2010). The present ﬁndings suggest the possibility that the efﬁ-
cacy of ABM training, designed to ameliorate depression by
changing attentional responding to positive information, might be
enhanced by ensuring that recipients engage in the self-referential
processing of this positive information during the ABM training
procedure. Training that increases attention towards positive in-
formation overall, rather than towards self-referentially processed
positive information, may yield no beneﬁt in terms of depression
reduction. Indeed, it is possible that, if such training were to in-
crease attention towards positive aspects of other individuals,
without reducing depression-linked attentional avoidance of self-
referentially processed positive information, then this may exac-
erbate the maladaptive social comparisons known to characterize
depressive vulnerability and dysfunction (Lyubomirsky & Ross,
1997; Swallow & Kuiper, 1988).
Of course, the present study has a number of limitations. First,
the number of participants was relatively small, and so it will be
important for future research to replicate the present study with
larger participant samples. Second, the current results have been
obtained using only a single measure of attentional deployment,
the dot-probe task, and some researchers have raised concerns
about the reliability of this task (Schmukle, 2005; Waechter,
Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2014). Thus, any future replica-
tions should seek to obtain converging evidence for our current
conclusions, ideally by employing multiple methods of measuring
attentional selectivity, and eye-tracking approaches offer particular
promise. Thirdly, although not strictly necessary for testing the
hypothesis under present scrutiny, the inclusion of a baseline
condition that did not involve either self-referential or other-
referential processing of the stimulus words could serve to
strengthen future research intended to extend the present work.
However, decisions concerning the appropriate baseline condition
would need to be takenwith care. For example, simply omitting any
direct instructions concerning whether to engage in self-referential
or other-referential processing in such a baseline condition would
not sufﬁce to preclude the possibility that such processing never-
theless may occur spontaneously. However, the prospect of refer-
ential processing taking place could be attenuated by requiring
participants to engage in the structural, rather than the semantic
processing, of stimulus words in such a baseline condition. While
this approach may preclude self-referential and other-referential
processing in this baseline condition, it would also reduce depth
of processing, potentially introducing a depth of processing
confound between the baseline and experimental conditions. Thus,
decisions concerning the choice of a baseline condition should be
guided by the speciﬁc nature of those future experimental ques-
tions that cannot be adequately resolved without including a
particular baseline condition.
It remains to be seen whether the present ﬁndings will be
replicated within clinically depressed populations and, if so,
whether the introduction of a self-referential processing require-
ment enhances the degree to which ABM procedures designed to
increase attention to positive information can therapeutically
contribute to the reduction of such dysfunction. For the moment,
however, the present study conﬁrms that elevated depression is
characterized by reduced attention to positive information, but for
the ﬁrst time shows that this effect is only evident when such in-
formation has been self-referentially processed. The ﬁnding that
depression-linked attentional bias to positive information is
moderated by referential processing focus advances understanding
of depression-linked attentional processing in a manner that may
J.L. Ji et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 93 (2017) 47e54 53contribute to the reﬁnement of more effective intervention tech-
niques, such as those designed to reduce depression by therapeu-
tically targeting the underlying patterns of cognitive bias.
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